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Nineteen-fifty nine’s steel strike was the largest labor strike of the
1950s, yet it is little remembered in most histories of the Eisenhower era. This
omission is not only surprising given the scale of the strike, but it also misses
a major part of the postwar political and social order, as well as the thought of
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his administration on those very questions of
the postwar order, extending to labor-capital relations.

These issues cannot be

fully understood without an examination of the response to them by Eisenhower and
his Secretary of Labor, James P. Mitchell. This event was one in which
Eisenhower’s political instincts noted by historian Fred Greenstein–“hidden-hand”
leadership style and a centrist approach to keep him above political fighting–did
not serve him well, as he failed to satisfy either the Steelworkers’ Union, the
steel corporations, or their political allies. 1

The reasons for this failure were

partly because the steel strike occurred near the end of his administration, but
they also were related to unresolved questions surrounding labor’s role in
postwar America, questions that Eisenhower inherited from the Roosevelt and
Truman administrations.
Given that Eisenhower was now confronting issues of capital-labor
confrontation that had given his predecessor political headaches, it is critical
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(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 57-58; Federation of Women
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Education, AFL-CIO, December 19, 1960, Folder: 1960 AFL-CIO (1), Box 117, both
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to identify clearly what his attitudes on capital-labor issues were. Eisenhower
had distinctive ideas about the ways in which society should be organized and a
distinctive style of exercising presidential leadership. These had significant
consequences for the administration’s course of action during the strike.
It is for this reason that it is crucial to define the terms used in this
article before discussing the strike and its larger political context. When the
phrase “The Corporate Commonwealth” is used, it is in reference to a specific
analysis of Dwight Eisenhower’s thought on social and economic questions that was
coined by political scientist Robert Griffith in the early 1980s. 2 Griffith
intended “corporate” in this context to refer to the older meaning of the term as
voluntary association, rather than the contemporary sense of the word, with its
connotations of modern capitalist organization. 3 Eisenhower, Griffith maintained,
had a vision of an ideal society grounded in classical republican notions of
virtue based on a corporate–in this older sense–society in which different
interests worked together for a common good. 4 References to “hidden-hand” methods
of presidential leadership that follow refer to historian Fred Greenstein’s
analysis of an Eisenhower political style that sought to exercise presidential
leadership behind the scenes, while cultivating a public image of aloofness from
the often unsavory business of politics. 5 Unfortunately for Eisenhower, the very
nature of strikes in general was profoundly disruptive to such cooperative
notions of societal harmony, and a prolonged strike in an industry critical to
national defense would expose his style of leadership’s weaknesses.
The strike began on July 15, 1959 at the headquarters of Bethlehem Steel in
Buffalo, New York, and quickly spread to other steel-producing areas around the
country. 6

It was the fifth to occur between 1945 and 1960–with previous strikes
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in 1946, 1949, 1952, and 1956–and was the largest of the postwar steel strikes. 7
The way in which the strike unfolded reflected some of the same major issues of
conflict between labor and management that had produced the wave of steel strikes
when Harry Truman was President. As Christopher G. L. Hall has noted in his
history of the steel industry, Steel Phoenix, recurring conflict in the industry
over identical issues occurred because collective bargaining in the industry
established a pattern of three-year contract negotiation cycles that led to major
strikes when the previous contract expired. 8
A crucial element of the 1947 steel contract was Section 2-B, with
corollaries won by the United Steelworkers in the subsequent strike of 1956, such
as Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB) and Cost of Living Adjustments
(COLAs). 9 SUBs and COLAs were part of a system of labor-management negotiated
benefits that one labor historian has termed “welfare capitalism” or “private
welfare plans.” 10 COLAs were guarantees that union wages would be adjusted for
price inflation over a three-year period, while SUBs covered a range of benefits
such as severance pay, pensions, health care, and job security guarantees. 11
Unionized workers’ guarantees under the contract were the major issues of
conflict in the strikes of 1949, 1952, and 1956, and they were still the major
issues at the heart of the 1959 steel strike. 12 Section 2-B of the 1947 steel
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contract additionally spelled out that “the scope of wages, hours of work, or
other conditions of employment” would be determined by local agreements between
the companies and trade union locals. But Section 2-B was otherwise written in
such a vague manner that conflict over its precise meaning was inevitable. 13 For
example, Section 2-B contained a clause allowing for the companies to “change or
eliminate local working conditions,” but only if

“the basis for the existence of

the local working condition is changed or eliminated,” and affected employees had
the opportunity to file grievance procedures. 14 Furthermore, the company had to
justify its action during such proceedings.
Beyond ambiguous and complex wording, conflict was also made quite likely by
a downturn in the United States economy in 1959, which caused the steel
corporations to hold out for much lower labor cost increases during the steel
industry talks, which then deadlocked. 15 Even before the strike, the companies
were operating at only two-thirds capacity, which reflected a weaker economy than
that which had prevailed in 1956. Steel corporations for this reason felt
justified in asking for changes in the contract, and they saw these changes as
necessary in order to remain competitive and to avoid steel price increases for
consumers. The circumstances that led to the strike thus did not stem from a
strong desire for a strike by either side, but they were instead the consequences
of incompatible goals in a year of economic recession.
All parties involved in and observers of the strike, including Eisenhower
himself, asserted that a long strike would be detrimental to the overall US
economy. Where they disagreed strongly, and split sharply along ideological lines
of political economy, was on the question of what was to be done about it. From
Eisenhower’s standpoint, it was imperative to keep presidential interference in
the strike minimal in order to maintain both “free collective bargaining” and the
kind of nonpartisan leadership in the public interest that could avoid drawing
the administration into divisive public controversy. 16
13. For details on Section 2-B, see ibid., especially p.102.
14. Quoted in ibid.
15. Hall, Steel Phoenix, 46.
16. Greenstein, Hidden-Hand Presidency, 5.
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The Truman administration had resolved the 1952 strike by resorting to
direct seizure of the steel plants by the military. 17 Such an action was anathema
to Eisenhower and Labor Secretary Mitchell, raising as it did Eisenhower’s fears
of creeping governmental control of society. 18 Truman’s base of support had
consisted of anticommunist liberals around the organization Americans For
Democratic Action, and these liberals were christened “The Vital Center” by
founding member and historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., as a means of
identifying themselves to the public as occupying an anticommunist middle in
between both the right and left-wing communist sympathizers. 19 Their chief
political goals were the preservation of the existing New Deal reforms,
especially as pertained to organized labor, and fighting “communist
totalitarianism,” at home and abroad. 20 To Schlesinger and the Vital Center
liberals, the two goals complimented each other, as labor unions free of
communist influences and “the social-welfare state” represented by Roosevelt’s
New Deal were needed to prevent communists from exploiting social inequality,
which a return to “business rule” would ensure. 21 “Strong government” in the
tradition of “the Hamilton-TR faith” that had marked a Roosevelt administration
in which “Keynes, not Marx,” was “the prophet of the new radicalism” was what the
ADA liberals deemed necessary to safeguard American society from totalitarianism
and preserve union gains of the 1930s. 22 In contrast to ADA liberals’ staunch
backing of Truman’s seizure of the steel mills as a necessary emergency measure
of the Korean War, Eisenhower refused to consider any action along the lines of
presidential or military seizure of the steel plants despite considerable public
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pressure from some Democrats to do precisely that. 23
Another legacy of Truman administration-era labor politics was the approach
that had been taken by Truman’s Republican enemies. Truman’s conservative
opponents had attempted to solve repeated industrial strife between capital and
labor by proposing laws to curb labor unions’ social and political power, which
they regarded as out of control. 24 Conservatives led by the National Association
of Manufacturers were aided in this endeavor by a public mood which was
exasperated with a wave of postwar strikes in 1946-47. 25 Responding to significant
segments of public opinion who were disgusted by “labor bosses” and their “abuses
of power,” Republicans gained control of Congress in 1946 for the first time
since the 1920s. 26 The National Labor Relations Act of 1947–or the Taft-Hartley
Act as it was popularly known, named after Senators Robert Taft of Ohio and Fred
Hartley of New Jersey–was the outcome of anti-union political ferment. 27 Among
Taft-Hartley’s major provisions: the “closed shop” (a labor union practice of
compelling all workers to join the union) was outlawed, injunctions and eightyday cooling off periods could be sought in federal court by the President and
Attorney General when strikes threatened an entire industry or a major portion
thereof, and all unions had to swear an affidavit declaring their opposition to
communism yearly or forfeit their ability to legally operate as unions. 28
Considering the Republican Party leadership’s strong identification with
Taft-Hartley in the Truman years, the fact that Eisenhower initially resisted
pressure from his own party’s right wing to invoke the act immediately in 1959
seems at first observation puzzling. However, concerns that too much heavy-handed

23. Letter from Paul Michelet to Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell, July
15, 1959, Folder: 1959 Steel Strike: June-July (1), Box 91, Mitchell Papers, DDE
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interference by the federal government endangered the process of collective
bargaining were highly significant in determining this course of action, as the
primary source record demonstrates. 29 The independence of collective bargaining
was emphasized repeatedly in public speeches and private letters by both the
President and his Secretary of Labor, and Mitchell especially saw uncoerced
collective bargaining as key to a democratic society. 30 Mitchell forcefully made
the case for the administration’s ideal view of labor-management relations in
1960:
I believe that the concentrations of economic power in America have a
responsibility to the common good, and that many of our needs can best be
met through the exercise and the initiative of that private responsibility.
This is one of the reasons why there must be a wider, better, more profound,
more continuous communication between those in whom the power to control
resides . . . Such cooperation rests upon voluntary, dependable, and abiding
communication. The time for labor and management to start talking to each
other is now. 31
Eisenhower was in favor of the Taft-Hartley Act, but only when all other
options were exhausted. Reaction to the strike by the public was so strong in
large part because, as one historian has noted, steel was integral to the US
economy in the 1950s, from the defense sector to that “quintessential symbol of
America in the late 1950s . . . the automobile” in the domestic economy. 32 Steel
29. Concerns about the maintenance of collective bargaining independent of
excessive federal governmental interference were in fact considered so important
by the administration that they were inserted into the 1960 Republican Campaign
Platform on Labor-Management Relations. See “1960 Campaign Platform, Page 3,”
January 1960, Folder: 1960 Campaign Platform (2), Box 4, Dwight D. Eisenhower
Papers As President (Ann Whitman File), Series: Campaign Series, DDE Library.
Also see “Secretary of Labor Mitchell Speech To Economic Club of Detroit, January
11, 1960, ‘Where Do We Go From Here in Labor-Management Relations?,’” Folder:
1960 Steel Strike (January 1-13) (1), Box 95, Mitchell Papers, DDE Library. This
speech also found in Folder: 124-D Steel Strike (4) (1959), Box 636, White House
Central Files–Official File, Eisenhower Papers As President, DDE Library.
30. Telegram From Edward G. Johnson to President Eisenhower, July 12, 1959,
Folder: 1959 Steel Strike: June-July (1), Box 91, Mitchell Papers, DDE Library.
Edward Johnson was a businessman. His telegram requests immediate invocation of
the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act.
31. “Address by Secretary of Labor Mitchell
January 11, 1960"
32. Hall, Steel Phoenix, xii.
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indeed was integral to the macroeconomic well-being of 1950s America, as much as
the computer would be later in the century. 33
For their part, the “Vital Center” liberal Democrats of Americans for
Democratic Action endorsed Eisenhower and Mitchell’s initial policy of government
nonintervention, with the qualification that if nonintervention did not work,
Taft-Hartley should be avoided, and a fact-finding board appointed instead to
investigate the strike’s causes. 34 Their visceral aversion to the Taft-Hartley
Act, like the Republican Right’s advocacy of the law, was rooted in the politics
of the previous presidential administration. Former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt
sent a more strongly worded telegram than the other ADA liberals to President
Eisenhower, requesting that a fact-finding board be appointed without
hesitation. 35 Democratic Senators such as Hubert Humphrey and John F. Kennedy
concurred with such an assessment. 36 ADA liberals’ version of centrism was thus in
accord with the spirit of Eisenhower’s initial policy, but they would not accept
Taft-Hartley as part of any such political consensus around moderation. They
rejected the idea that Taft-Hartley was in any way necessary for the public good.
Liberals also lacked patience for Eisenhower’s “hidden-hand” presidential style
of approaching crises, and ironically like their opponents to Eisenhower’s right,
they mistook this style for a lack of leadership on Eisenhower’s part. To
liberals, the New Deal approach of direct and bold presidential exercise of
leadership and protection of organized labor from attacks on it by business were
pillars of a good society.
The Steel Corporations and the Republican right, on the other hand, defined
33. Ibid., xii-xiii.
34. Americans For Democratic Action (ADA) Letter From Edward Hollander to
President Eisenhower, September 18, 1959, Folder: 1959 Steel Strike (September
15-30), Box 93, Mitchell Papers, DDE Library
35. Telegram From Eleanor Roosevelt and Herbert Lehman to President
Eisenhower, National Council For Industrial Peace, September 28, 1959, Folder:
124-D--Steel Strike (3), Box 636, File: White House Central Files–Official File,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers As President (hereafter cited as Eisenhower Papers
as President), DDE Library.
36. Telegram From Senators Clark et al. to President Eisenhower, September
25, 1959, Folder: 124-D--Steel Strike (3), Box 636, File: Official File–White
House Central Files 124-D, DDE Library.
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the public interest as endangered by what they said were the selfish and
“inflationary” designs of “Big Labor.” 37 Conservatives maintained that labor’s
abuse of power included aspects of the 2-B section of the 1947 steel contract to
which they strongly objected. Business leaders and conservative politicians
especially deplored work practices that included both superfluous work and extra
breaks at work, which they called “featherbedding,” and charged that these
wasteful practices flowed from “rigid work rules” in the existing steel
contract. 38 Steel company officials vehemently denied that they were trying to
break the Steelworkers Union in any way or to reduce benefits. They also accused
the Steelworkers Union of interfering with needed automation that would improve
efficiency, and they demanded an end to “wildcat strikes” (unauthorized by labor
leadership) in the industry. Their version of what constituted the public good
was if anything even more suspicious than Eisenhower was of New Deal-era
developments that they regarded as creeping statism, and they could not conceive
of organized labor as a force for anything positive in American society. Unlike
Eisenhower, the Republican right did not envision an ideal society being
guaranteed by compromise.
For its part, the union responded to charges by the steel companies that 2-B
and its corollaries were part of wasteful “featherbedding” by charging with equal
vehemence that the companies were engaged in a drive to “break the union.” 39 They
saw any concessions on the issues of work rules and the 1947 steel contract’s 2-B
section as “backward steps,” which were part of a deliberate attempt by the steel
companies to roll back the gains made by organized labor since the Great

37. “Statement By R. Conrad Cooper Before the President’s Board of Inquiry
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38. Ibid.; Gilbert A. Harrison, “Steel’s Strategy,” The New Republic 141:
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1, 1959,” October 9, 1959, File Folder: 1960–Inquiry Board–Steel (3), Box 143 and
“News From the AFL-CIO,” April 8, 1959, Folder: 1959 AFL-CIO (correspondence on
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Depression. 40 Furthermore, the union would not agree to discuss the work practice
clauses in the 1947 steel contract without prior agreement on the private welfare
plans in the contract that they called “the economic issues. ”The unions thus saw
at stake hard-won gains that guaranteed workers’ prosperity and well-being, “such
as overtime distribution systems, relief periods, spell arrangements, wash-up
arrangements, safety precautions, lunch periods, [and] crew size.” 41 They insisted
that they did not oppose automation to improve efficiency, and that greater
mechanization did not require significant changes in work rules.
The strike lasted eight months, resulting in a shutdown of a staggering
eighty-seven percent of the steel industry’s capacity, making it nearly
impossible for the administration to continue to stay out of the strike. 42
Eisenhower found fault with all sides. He could not understand why the parties to
the strike would be so oblivious to his conception of the common good, especially
because he was on such cordial personal terms with both Steelworkers Union leader
David McDonald and US Steel Corporation head Roger Blough. 43 Eisenhower became
“sick and tired” of the strike, and on October 9, 1959, he created a Board of
Inquiry to study the strike and to recommend appropriate actions. 44 The economic
damage that would be done by a long strike already made the strike part of an
“intolerable situation” that “must not continue.” 45

40. “A Summary of the Steel Dispute: Positions of the Parties (Based on a
Board of Inquiry),” December 16 1959, Folder: 1959 Steel Strike, Box 7, Kendall
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42. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 456-57; Hall, Steel Phoenix, 46; David Brody,
Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 197.
43. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change: 1953-56 (New York: Doubleday
and Co., 1963), 490-91; James C. Hagerty, “Statement By The President,” October 9
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What finally forced a shift in administration policy from initial aloofness
through preliminary action to strong intervention in the form of invocation of
the injunction and eighty-day cooling off period provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act were the strike’s ramifications for the military. 46 Eisenhower’s political
advisors and the Defense Department found especially intolerable the strike’s
interference with the production of ATLAS, TITAN, and POLARIS missiles, all of
which required a special steel. 47 In the case of POLARIS, it was a shortage of
plate steel that was the problem; with ATLAS and TITAN, steel shortages were
interfering with the production of pressure vessels. This appalled Eisenhower and
Secretary of Labor Mitchell, who held that “an economic institution like a steel
corporation or a labor union must serve the public interest as fully as its own
interests.” 48 Clearly, given such Cold War considerations of national defense, the
strike was considered an especially egregious violation of the public trust
expected of economic institutions. Eisenhower could not abide disruption of the
US military and national defense for a prolonged period of time, especially given
the protracted geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union.
President Eisenhower instructed Attorney General William Rogers to seek an
injunction in court against the strike on October 21, 1959, which the US Supreme
Court upheld on November 7, 1959. 49 This action pleased no one. The anti-union
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wing of the Republican Party and the steel corporations saw the action as having
been delayed for far too long, while organized labor was angered by the
injunction, and politically mobilized for the 1960 election. 50
Adding to the right-wing frustration with Eisenhower’s handling of the
strike was the fact that it ended in a significant defeat for Bethlehem Steel
management and the largest postwar union victory, as the steel industry’s central
demand for change in work rules lost out in the Mitchell-brokered negotiations. 51
The January 1960 settlement that Mitchell and Vice-President Nixon negotiated did
include smaller wage increases than those that had prevailed in the previous
steel contracts. But the Steelworkers Union successfully retained the Cost of
Living Adjustment clause for inflation, and it actually expanded the Supplemental
Unemployment Benefits for union members. 52 Health care and pension programs
provided for in the contract were also strengthened. 53
Examples of conservative fury at the settlement and the administration were
found among newspaper columnists to Eisenhower’s right. These columnists included
Arthur Krock of The New York Times, who–along with the corporations themselves–
was livid that Nixon and Mitchell had, as he saw it, sided with the union so
strongly. Accordingly, these conservatives withheld their support for Nixon for
the first half of 1960. 54 There were even rumors in the press at the time that
Nixon influenced the settlement as part of an attempted bargain to garner the
support of the Steelworkers Union in the 1960 election. 55 Mitchell and Nixon made

John Hopkins University Press, 2001), 1727; Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The
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a bold gamble for the vote of a traditionally Democratic constituency in what
would be a very close presidential election. They underestimated conservative
dissatisfaction with their policy decision, as much as Eisenhower had been taken
by surprise at the degree of union anger directed at his use of the injunction.
To ideological conservatives such as William F. Buckley, Jr., the outcome of
the steel strike was just one more reason to reject President Eisenhower’s
“Middle Way” Republicanism as philosophically “permitting so many accretions,
modifications, emendations, emasculations, and qualifications that the original
thing [conservatism] quite recedes from view.” 56 This increasingly angry right
wing of Eisenhower’s party had grumbled throughout his presidency about his
failure to dismantle New Deal liberal programs, and it would mobilize enough to
take over the Republican Party four years later. Krock echoed the rage of the
right against Eisenhower when he said, “This Republican administration has been
as one with its Democratic predecessor in declining to attack the root of the
labor monopoly.” 57 In other words, angry anti-union conservatives saw little or no
difference between Eisenhower and Truman in labor policy.
The consequences politically for Vice-President Nixon and Secretary of Labor
Mitchell’s attempts to court the labor vote for the Republicans in 1960 were
detrimental: Kennedy increased labor support for the Democrats eleven percent
over Stevenson’s total in 1956, to sixty-four percent. 58 Such an increase in the
Democratic share of the labor vote over such a short time was especially
striking, considering the fact that just eight years earlier organized labor had
a relatively high opinion of Eisenhower and a low one of Adlai Stevenson. 59 Labor

56. Buckley quoted in E.J. Dionne, Jr., Why Americans Hate Politics (New
York: Touchstone Books, 1991), 174.
57. Krock cited in Metzgar, Striking Steel, 90.
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Mitchell Papers, and “Salute to James P. Mitchell,” The Washington Post, June 29
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leaders had considered Stevenson too aloof and out of touch with working-class
voters and did not see Eisenhower as a serious threat to the achievements of the
New Deal and organized labor in the 1930s.
Eisenhower’s use of the act during the 1959 steel strike shattered such
assumptions and undermined his carefully crafted reputation for neutrality in
public controversies. 60

Damage to Nixon’s chances in 1960 was indeed done,

because the AFL-CIO leadership viewed the injunction as a betrayal of the postwar
contract that they would not forgive. 61 Labor leadership had tolerated, and some
labor members had supported, Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956 because they sensed that
he was a supporter of the postwar labor-capital order that was opposed to the
expansion of the New Deal social programs but would not dismantle established
ones. 62 Now they turned to Kennedy, who like Eisenhower had been in 1952, was
perceived by voters as someone who would preserve Roosevelt’s New Deal but not go
any further. Given defeats suffered with the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin
labor reform acts by organized labor in the late 1940s and 1950s and the hard
struggle required to beat back the “right-to-work” campaign by corporations a
year earlier, organized labor was in no mood to forgive the use of an injunction.
Why, then, had the usually cautious Eisenhower risked and reaped such a
result from his invocation of Taft-Hartley? From Eisenhower’s own perspective, it
made perfect sense: his vision of “corporate commonwealth” demanded departure
from caution and hidden-hand approaches to leadership when he perceived the
public good to be seriously endangered, especially if that involved national
defense. Eisenhower therefore abandoned his hidden-hand political style out of
considerations for the strike’s impact upon the economy and the military, two
major bulwarks of the public well-being in his worldview.
The pyrrhic nature of this union “victory” was quite ironic. The laborcontract cycle that had produced this strike as well as the previous four postwar
steel strikes began to affect international trade in steel by 1959, with dire
University Press, 1996), 97.
60. Metzgar, Striking Steel, 76.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
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consequences for the future of large American steel. 63 The aftershocks of the
strike combined with corporate-sponsored protectionist legislation to increase
the cost of US steel, to the point of making it uncompetitive with cheaper
Japanese steel. This development was an unintended and unforseen consequence of
union strikes and company protectionism, which would greatly undermine the wellbeing of both the union and companies. In this sense, it can be said that neither
side in the strike really won. The 1970s and 1980s would not be nearly as kind to
American steel or labor unions as the 1940s and 1950s had been.
There were other consequences, felt much sooner. For example, the 1962 clash
between the steel industry and President Kennedy over the decision by US Steel to
raise its prices after it had pledged not to do so, was in some ways a result of
this uneasy settlement in the industry. Having been defeated by the Steelworkers’
Union, the companies tried to increase steel prices in order to offset their
costs. In response, President Kennedy ordered the Justice Department and FBI to
threaten them with arrest for criminal violations of antitrust law. 64
Partially because of the pain and inconvenience felt by both sides in the
1959 strike, and also owing to continued economic growth, the 1960s did not have
the major steel strikes that had marked the immediate postwar years of the 1940s
and 1950s. 65 The 1960s, however, would be the decade that would continue the
process of undoing the American Cold War consensus. If cracks had appeared with
the strike and subsequent collapse of Eisenhower’s presidential style and broader
political program, Vietnam and race in the 1960s would similarly mean the end of
the kind of anticommunist consensus liberalism identified with the ADA under
Eisenhower. President Johnson would be the central figure around which the 1960s
upheavals destroyed “Vital Center” liberalism, much as Eisenhower had been the
key figure around which “Middle Way” Republicanism crumbled. The consequences for
labor would be disastrous, as the most ardent anti-labor conservatives would
dominate the American political scene as a result of the twin collapses of
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moderate Republicanism and the old liberal Democrats. 66 Part of the reason for the
former was that, for all of the strengths of Eisenhower’s “Middle Way” political
approach, he “failed to create” a long-term “base for Modern Republicanism” that
would have otherwise stood between the right and a gravely weakened liberalism. 67
Viewed from the perspective of the immediate aftermath of the strike,
however, the outcome of the 1959 steel strike demonstrated the scope of organized
labor’s influence at the zenith of its prestige as well as the sharp divide
between Eisenhower and members of his own party on the question of postwar
industrial relations. Symbolically, it represented to victorious steelworkers of
the time the culmination of decades of labor organizing and struggle, and the
legacy of such struggle. It also was interpreted as part of the legacy of labor
reform in the Franklin Roosevelt administration. The steel corporations, faced
with an economic slump, had attempted to recover management prerogatives lost
during the 1930s and 1940s, and had failed. 68 The New Deal-Keynesian order would
be secure for the next decade, reaching its pinnacle during the years of
Eisenhower’s successors, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.
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